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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
cases which deem ineffective, contractual waiver of the right to notice
and a hearing prior to seizure of certain types of property.
Additionally, the practitioner is urged to familiarize himself with
In re Frutiger, a Court of Appeals decision which apparently injects
fresh thought into an area of law generally understood to be well settled.
Therein, the Court upheld the withdrawal, prior to probate decree,
of a waiver of citation and consent to probate, despite the absence of
any showing of fraud, duress, misrepresentation or other basis for
vitiating the waiver, where the status quo remained unchanged, i.e.,
no interested party's rights were prejudiced.
The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's pro-
cedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less
important, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included.
While few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey
accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant
developments in the procedural law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to direct the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to him.
The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically treated in the
cases are listed under their respective titles.
ARTICLE 2- LIMrrATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 208: Tolling provision held applicable even though prisoner
had legal capacity to sue.
Under CPLR 208, the statute of limitations is tolled during a
disability due to imprisonment on a criminal charge or conviction for
a term less than for life.' In Ortiz v. LaVallee,2 a recent Second Circuit
decision, the court was confronted with the question of whether the
tolling provision was intended to apply even where a prisoner had
the legal capacity to bring an action while incarcerated. Plaintiff had
instituted this action under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871.3
1The pertinent language of CPLR 208 provides:
If a person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action
accrues . .. imprisoned on a criminal charge or conviction for a term less than
for life, and the time otherwise limited for commencing the action is three years
or more . . .the time within which the action must be commenced shall be ex-
tended to three years after the disability ceases.... The time within which the
action must be commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten
years after the cause of action accrues. ...
2 422 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1971).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Plaintiff, in his complaint, alleged that in July of 1965 he
was assaulted and mistreated by prison officials while incarcerated in Auburn State Prison.
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The cause of action had arisen in July, 1965, but the complaint was not
filed until August, 1969.
The timeliness of an action commenced under the Civil Rights Act
is governed by the statute of limitations which the state courts would
apply in a similar state action.4 It was determined that the plaintiff's
suit would be subject to the three-year limitation period embodied in
CPLR 214(2).5 It is therefore evident, that since the complaint was not
filed within three years from the date the cause of action arose, the suit
would be barred unless the tolling provision of CPLR 208 were invoked.
It was the contention of the state, that the applicability of CPLR
208 is limited to those situations where New York law would preclude
an imprisoned felon from initiating a suit,6 and that the New York
"civil death" statute does not debar a state prisoner from suing under
the Federal Civil Rights Act. Thus, since plaintiff had the legal capacity
to bring the action while incarcerated, the toll should not be available.
Rather than adopt the seemingly tenable position of the state,
the court concluded that practical considerations mandated a literal
application of the tolling provision. The decision relied upon the
legislative intent as evidenced by an advisory committee report pertain-
ing to the adoption of CPLR 208. 7 The report alluded to the impeditive
difficulties which a prisoner would be confronted with upon attempting
to bring an action during incarceration.8
Literal interpretation of CPLR 208 is certainly warranted in view
of the pragmatic considerations.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302: Dual jurisdictional aspects of matrimonial action upheld.
Matrimonial actions have a dual function: (1) determination of
the parties' marital status and (2) provision of support for the plain-
tiff. In rem jurisdiction empowers a court to grant the first form of
4 See Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963).
5 CPLR 214(2) provides that "an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfei-
ture created or imposed by statute.. ," must be commenced within three years.
6 See NY. Civ. RIGHrS LAW § 79 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
7 SEcoND REP. 58.
8 The provisions for extension because of the existence of the stated disabilities
present controversial policy questions but the committee concluded that no change
should presently be made in the grounds for extension .... As to a person im-
prisoned, legal capacity to sue, if it exists, is only a theoretical right. Litigants
have difficulty enough, though they be at large, tracking down their obligors
and determining the nature of the liability and where, when and whether to sue.
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